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The paper examines the legacy of the debate over perfectly contestable markets, 
the usefulness of several variations on the theory of imperfectly contestable 
markets including consideration of the problems associated with identifying 
contestable markets, and the contribution of contestability theory to the 
understanding of industry structure and appropriate industry policy. The debate 
surrounding contestability theory prompted economists to critically reassess the 
neoclassical theory of the firm, particularly with respect to: impediments to 
potential competition; the complementary role of potential and actual competition 
in affecting the conduct of incumbent firms; and the role and direction of 
appropriate industry regulation. The major problems identified by the debate are 
the difficulty in determining the extent to which markets may be imperfectly 
contestable and the framing of policy approaches appropriate to specific industry 
contexts. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
75 
Baumol (1982) with Panzer and Willig (1982), BPW hereafter, presented 
contestability theory as a general model of industrial organisation that did not 
presuppose the optimality of any particular industry structure. The theory endeavored 
to overcome the problems arising from the stringent assumptions required under 
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perfect competition to achieve an efficient allocation of society's resources and the 
ensuing problem of second best solutions to achieve technical and allocative 
efficiency. 
Contestability theory re-emphasised the premise that the existence of potential 
entrants may act as a disciplining force over the conduct of incumbents firms, 
regardless of industry structure, if particular conditions hold. As presented by 
BPW, a perfectly contestable market is one in which: (i) entrants have access to the 
same production techniques and factor markets as incumbents (no cost barriers to 
entry); (ii) entrants can serve the same market demands as incumbents (no demand 
barriers to entry); and (iii) there are no entry or exit costs. These conditions give 
entrants the "shooting gallery" choice, namely when to exit the market before the 
incumbents are able to respond to market entry. Potential entrants are also able to 
decide whetber entry will be profitable before commitment based on tbe current 
market price because incumbents are held to be incapable of retaliation before exit 
can take place. 
Contestability theory no longer holds widespread support amongst academic 
economists in the field of microeconomic policy because tbe assumptions have 
come to be regarded as implausible as a matter oflogicor empirical evidence. Why 
these conditions were challenged is well documented in the literature (see Spence 
1983, Shepherd 1984, Scherer 1989, Agliardi 1990 and Kessides 1991 ), but what 
is lacking is an assessment of the benefit of the debate over contestability. This 
paper reviews tbe contribution of the debate in relation to contestability theory and 
imperfectly contestable markets in Sections 2 and 3 respectively, Section 4 presents 
a syntbesis of tbe conditions under which the hit-and-run entry concept will be 
directly applicable in developing specific industry policy, Section 5 considers 
useful developments incontestability theory, Section 6 outlines a range of empirical 
issues in relation to testing for tbe contestability of markets, Section 7 summarises 
tbe implications of tbe debate in witb particular reference to neoclassical views of 
efficient industry structures and of regulatory frameworks, and Section 8 concludes 
tbe paper. 
2. THE PERFECTLY CONTESTABLE MODEL AND ITS LEGACY 
There are a number reasons why contestability theory made such an initial impact 
in microeconomic theory and policy. First, the conventional wisdom had placed 
more emphasis on competition among firms already established in any industry, 
than on the firms outside it. Second, and related to the first reason, tbe threat of 
potential competition in shaping the formation of business policy had not been 
empirically substantiated. Third, BPW's concern for tbe general application of 
their model of perfect contestability caused economists to focus on the plausibility 
of the model's assumptions rather than see the real contribution of contestability 
theory- namely that barriers to exit (sunk costs}, which would preclude hit -and-run 
entry to markets, could be as much a source of monopoly power as barriers to entry. 
Finally, the model appeared to provide academic credibility to political forces in the 
United States favoring removal of the prevailing regulatory regime. 
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The appeal of contestability theory arose from the conclusion that the allocative 
and productive efficiencies of perfect competition could be achieved in industries 
with relatively high levels of market concentration. The theory appeared to reverse 
the direction of microeconomic theory stemming from Bain's (1950a, 1950b) 
analysis ofthe importance of potential entry and its relationship with the nature and 
height of the barriers to entry, the industry structure and the conduct of firms 
actively competing. Bain's batriers to entry (absolute cost advantages, product 
differentiation and the minimum efficient scale of entry) restricted the ability of 
potential entrants to discipline the conduct of incumbent firms. In the pure form, the 
contestable market thesis simply assumed away Bain's barriers to entry. 
In the pursuit of a general application, BPW conferred upon their model many 
of the assumptions of perfect competition, such as perfect knowledge, perfect factor 
mobility, and the homogeneity of products. Yet a single deviation from these 
stringent assumptions may confer advantages to incumbent firms. 
Contestability theory drew attention to sunk costs (which had generally been 
neglected by economists), stressing the distinction between entry and exit costs. In 
a perfectly contestable market, an entrant must not have the burden of sunk costs 
when incumbent firms respond to their market entry. The influence of sunk costs 
on the nature of competition was, however, recognised much earlier early this 
century by the "railway economists" such as Meyer (1906) and transport economists 
in the 1960s such as Kolsen (1968). Nevertheless, the contestability debate served 
to increase the recognition amongst economists, beyond the transport area, that the 
presence of sunk costs affects the behaviour of incumbent firms, in a static sense. 
Yet, the real importance of sunk costs in a dynamic sense has been understated 
because oligopoly theories (particularly contestability theory in the extreme) have 
been cast in a mould limited, in the main, to one-round games played by rivals 
ignorant about how their rivals will react. Nothing could be further from reality, as 
the history of transport demonstrates repeatedly. 
The perfectly contestable model with its implied Bertrand-Nash expectation of 
entrants (incumbent non-reponse before exit is made) simplifies the game strategy. 
An entrant may take the static view that incumbents' prices are fixed and that a 
lower vector of prices may capture the entire market (BPW 1988:350). An 
alternative way of stating this condition is that the entrant's exit lag is shorter than, 
or equal to, the incumbents' response lag2. This assumption circumvents the full 
range of dynamic post-entry price, quantity and quality games of traditional 
oligopoly interaction. 
Bain recognised the conflict between the Bertrand-Nash assumption of entrants 
and the logical response of incumbents to large-scale entry, hence his limit price 
thesis to prevent this eventuality. From his work, two lines of reasoning arise that 
are relevant to an assessment of the contribution of contestability theory. First, the 
potential entrant may not be guided by the current market price (relative to expected 
Where the incumbents' response takes the form of a change in pricing, as per the Bertrand 
model, or a change in the quantity supplied, as per the Cournot model, ceteris paribus. 
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costs) but rather by what posr.-entry price and rivalry are expected. Second, 
potential entrants to the industry regard the price as an indicator both of the 
character of industry demand and of the probable character of rival policy after 
entry (Bain 1950a:452). Indeed, the limit pricing thesis was extended to explain 
why, if incumbents fail to limit price and entry occurs, the predatory response of 
incumbents may provide a further disincentive to entry. 
Where Bain and BPW differed was in their interpretation of the incumbent's 
response. Baumol's position on incumbents' price responses is not truly a strong 
form of the Bertrand-Nash assumption. Baumol merely assumed that incumbents' 
prices were only sticky over a period that "renders all production costs economically 
reversible" (Baumol and Willig 1986:14). The term, hit-and-run entry, was 
introduced into the debate by Shepherd (1984:576) to describe the brief but large-
scale entry suggested by BPW. In a perfectly contestable market there is no entry 
lag - no information, recognition or response lags - on the part of the entrant and 
exit can be instantaneous and costless. The hit-and-run concept of entry reduces the 
entry decision in the perfectly contestable model to a consideration of non-
reversible costs and current prices, rather than the scale of production and post-
entry prices. The post-entry game situation is effectively disregarded. So, without 
the hit-and-run entry concept and its associated assumptions, the set of perfectly 
contestable industries would be limited to those industries that could truly be 
described as perfectly competitive. 
Reconciliation between the Baumol position and the Bertrand-Nash assumption 
is dependent on the possibility of hit-and-run entry. BPW (1988:426,410-11) were 
cognisant of the simplification such an assumption involved. However, policy 
makers have commonly failed to consider whether hit-and-run entry might be 
feasible before pronouncing on the merits of the perfectly contestable market. 
Rationalisation of the no-response assumption on small-scale entry grounds, 
for reasons of short-term profits or acquisition of market intelligence (by multiproduct 
firms), ultimately fails due to the long-term implications of such actions. It may be 
justifiable for the incumbents to ignore small firms (BPW 1988:11) until they are 
a threat, but as the efficient scale of entry increases, the plausibility of no response 
from incumbent firms becomes increasingly questionable because the required 
adjustments also increase accordingly (Shepherd 1984:573). Information seeking 
entrants, such as multi-product (multi-market) firms from other markets, may enter 
a new market on a less than minimum efficient scale in order to improve their 
knowledge of the market or to pre-empt a competitor (Green 1986 and Cairns and 
Mahabir 1988). Such entry involves the cross-subsidisation of production in the 
new market. This is unsustainable in the perfectly contestable market because ofthe 
ease of entry into, and exit from, markets which prevents the redistribution of 
supernormal profits (BPW 1988:202). 
Leaving aside the implausibility of the Bertrand-Nash assumption, prices 
adjustments may be slow, and result in a lagged response to new entry by 
incumbents, due to menu costs associated pricing changes or contractual 
arrangements. Where long-term contracts dominate relationships between firms 
and their clients, such as the coal industry, the market commonly subdivides into 
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contract and spot -auction sectors. It is then only the latter that is subject to contest 
in the short term. Baumol and Willig (1986:24) thought entry by contract more 
relevant in the commercial sector, but in Australia entry by contract is common in 
a range of markets including road freight transport and integrated logistics and, to 
a lesser extent, in air freight markets. 
This section demonstrates with regard to the perfectly contestable model that 
(i) there is a considerable degree of commonality between the perfectly competitive 
market model and the perfectly contestable market model, (ii) when viewed from 
the present, the model is essentially an extension ofBain 's work on barriers to entry, 
industry structure and market conduct, and (iii) the debate in relation to the model 
prompted economists to critically reassess their understanding of the (neoclassical) 
theory of the firm, in particular the significance of potential competition and sunk 
costs, especially exit costs, as an impediment to potential competition. 
3. THE IMPERFECTLY CONTESTABLE MARKET 
The debate over contestability theory became an investigation of the plausibility 
and existence of imperfectly contestable markets that approach, but do not strictly 
conform to, the conditions of perfect contestability. Two models of imperfect 
contestability are prominent in the literature and are based on the relaxation of the 
conditions necessary for hit-and-run entry- the exit lag approach and the sunk cost 
approach. 
The exit-lag approach describes the situation in which the entry deterring price 
may be higher than the competitive level because the exit-lag exceeds the price-
response lag (e.g. Schwartz 1986). The longer the period over which fixed costs 
become economically reversible for the entrant, the more likely incumbents will be 
able to adjust prices (and/or quantities). If entrants are exposed to predatory pricing, 
or other forms of retaliation, for any considerable period their profit stream will be 
reduced and the initial attractiveness of entry will dissipate. Hence, the entry-
limiting price may exceed the competitive level and render the market imperfectly 
contestable in the margin and non-contestable in the limit. 
With the sunk cost approach (e.g. Agilardi 1990), the degree of sunk or non-
reversible costs is held to limit the extent of the contestability of a market. Entrants 
may exit the market at any time and forego a proportion of their fixed costs as non-
reversible. The smaller the fraction of costs lost, the easier exit from the market 
becomes, the more closely the market approaches perfect contestability and the 
limit price approaches the competitive level. 
Both approaches are equally plausible. Exit speed and sunk cost can influence 
the profit of the entrant. However, de novo entry into a market requires time for 
planning, market research, factor acquisition, gaining access to infrastructure and 
the application of resources to this process. Even an established firm considering 
expansion requires time to acquire information, recognise and differentiate between 
varying opportunities and time to marshal the resources to respond appropriately. 
In some instances it may be a matter of years before firms react to profit 
opportunities. Further research may be warranted in relation to the speed and 
flexibility of entry to emerging markets facilitated via internet commerce. 
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Similarly, it is unlikely that the preparation for entry can be done in secret so 
as to ensure that incumbent firms do not pre-emptively limit prices or expand 
capacity to produce (or retain the capacity to do so at short notice) or stockpile to 
flood the market with product at predatory prices. The difficulties of secret 
preparation apply equally in factor markets (e.g. the 1998 Waterfront Dispute in 
Australia where Patricks Stevedoring endeavoured to secretly train non-unionised 
stevedores in Dubai in order to provide an alternative workforce to the members of 
the Maritime Union of Australia). 
The preparation lag approach might be extended by considering an imperfectly 
contestable market in which it takes a period of time before new entrants can be 
effective rivals (a "learning curve" effect). This could be interpreted to mean that 
it takes time to effectively serve the same market demands as incumbents or operate 
with a similar cost structure. If information is imperfectly distributed, flrms may 
have variable or lagged access to technology and other production processes. 
Incumbent flrms may also possess absolute or strategic cost advantages, at least in 
the short run. This does not ignore, of course, the possibility that new entrants could 
be better informed than incumbents if they are transferring product knowledge or 
production technology from other markets, but if this were the case there would be 
little incentive to exit the market unless imitation was easy. 
There is no perceived difference in the quality of new entrants' product or outputs 
in the theory of either perfectly competitive or perfectly contestable markets. 
However, new entrants may be able to service the same market demands as 
incumbents only with a learning lag or as the "accumnlative preferences ofbuyers for 
established brand names and company reputations" adjust to include the new entrant 
(Bain 1972:83). 1f information is imperfectly distributed, uncertainty about the 
quality of the goods and services provided by new entrants may impede their 
accumnlation of market share. This is consistent with Schmalensee 's (1982) model 
of first mover advantage. For example, new entrants into an airline charter industry 
may initially be regarded as "fly by night" operators. Several crashes of chartered 
aircraft in Australia in recent years have fuelled this perception (e.g. the Seaview 
Inquiry, BASI (1998)). The costs of advertising to remove such an information 
asymmetry may create a "sunk cost barrier to entry" (Kessides 1991:44). In this way, 
real and perceived non-price factors, such as brand loyalty, are likely to have first 
order implications in imperfectly contestable markets where information is imperfect. 
Operators not aligned with incumbent firms will be disadvantaged in these regards. 
The existence and strengthening of switching costs may also lengthen the 
period before new entrants can effectively serve the same market demands as 
incumbents (e.g. Gilbert 1989:506). The growth of incentive programs, such as 
airline clubs and frequent flyer programs, in creating switching costs suggests the 
strategy has net benefits for incumbent flrms- at least in the short-term. The trend 
to global airline alliances- interregional integration- has placed pressure on non-
aligned airlines to associate themselves with "a rival global alliance", when their 
regional competitors have taken such action (e.g. McGuire 1998:58). The process 
is also driven by the advantages of access to extended route networks, information 
flows and booking agencies. 
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If firms are uncertain about future demand ccnditions, incumbent firms may 
develop excess capacity in the short run instead oflimiting prices in order to prevent 
entry. The aluminum industry exhibits such practices. Such a strategy is not 
sustainable unless specific circumstances apply - high start-up production costs 
and low marginal ccsts. Appelbaum and Lim (1990) suggest that with ccnditions 
of demand uncertainty, the level of ex ante quantity pre-ccmmitment may act as a 
strategic advantage for incumbent firms. Excess capacity diminishes the 
attractiveness of entry because of the propensity for incumbents to engage in price 
wars and prolong price wars due to their minimal short-run marginal costs3• This 
echoes remarks made in the context of rate wars and capacity investments in the US 
railway industry late in the 19th century (see Meyer 1906:252). The simplified 
contestability model assumes that there is no demand uncertainty or ability to 
sustain sub-optimal ccst structures. 
As well as the impact of imperfect information, factor market imperfections 
may advantage incumbent firms. Differences in real factor prices are likely to be 
greatest in markets ccvering large regions or spreading internationally. Oum and 
Yu (1998) found statistically significant differences in international airline ccst 
ccmpetitiveness resulting from differences in factor prices after allowing for 
network and output variations between regions. These differences in input prices 
have influenced initiatives to improve airline productivity over time following 
market liberalisation. For example, the US airlines American, Eastern and United 
adopted two-tier wage systems in the wake of domestic airline deregulation 
(Petzinger 1995: 129-33,248-249, 228). Incumbent firms are often able to capitalise 
on certain and long-term supply relationships with .factor suppliers, such as 
suppliers of capital and strategic raw materials to create ccst advantages, perhaps 
at the expense of a degree of price I quality and ccst flexibility. 
The exercise of market power in factor markets may also extend to capital 
markets. Risk profiles of established firms, and new firms, may be judged 
differently by capital markets, thereby raising the ccst of obtaining capital funds for 
new firms relative to incumbents. This was ably demonstrated by airline deregulation 
in Australia. When publicly-owned Qantas was privatised, its share float was 
oversubscribed. When privately-owned Compass Airlines Mark II was floated, its 
share issue was under-subscribed by the public, even with the Queensland 
Government as the underwriter (Nyathi et. a!. 1993a, 1993b). A related problem is 
the signalling effects of a failed entrants, such as Compass Airlines Mark I and II 
in the early years of the deregulated Australian domestic airline market, for future 
capital raising by potential entrants. 
Given the ccnstraints of imperfect information and factor market imperfections, 
the disciplining effects of potential entry tend to be long run in nature, rather than 
short run. The entry-lag approach presented above, which acccmmodates imperfect 
Although a matter of degree in imperfectly contestable markets, the competitive 
implications of the conunitrnent to irrevocable investment in noncontestable markets 
have been established by Dixit (1980) and Salop and Scheffman (1983), among others. 
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factor markets, suggests that imperfectly contestable markets may be based on the 
principle ofhit-and-stay entry. Entry is expected to be unprofitable until information 
asymmetries and factor market imperfections are resolved. Entry will occur only 
if (i) the price of goods and services after this period will be sufficient to compensate 
the entrant, and (ii) rivalry between the new entrant and incumbents is not likely to 
totally undermine these prices. Consequently, the policy challenge is how to restrict 
the extent of entry and exit barriers, rather than to assume they do not exist. The 
legacy of the contestability debate is a model of imperfect contestability that assists 
the understanding, rather than the prediction, of market forces. 
4. HIT-AND-RUN, A DOMINANT ENTRY STRATEGY? 
As representations of imperfectly contestable markets developed in the literature, 
the notion that hit-and-run entry could effectively discipline firm conduct in 
concentrated industries was found to be conditional on the particular characteristics 
of the market. An entrant may be willing and capable of sustaining heavy losses in 
the initial periods after entry if the entrant (i) judges the industry to be capable of 
sustaining additional capacity as a growing market, (ii) believes that it possesses 
long-term competitive advantages over incumbent firms, and (iii) believes that in 
the long term it will be fully compensated for the costs of entry, establishment and 
competition with incumbent firms. The history of US and English competitive 
battles between the railways, and with inland water transport, in the latter half of 
the 19th century, reveal that these beliefs were held by entrants (see Meyer 1906, 
Cleveland-Stevens 1915 and Ackworth and Stevenson 1924). 
With a long-term entry strategy, the entrant may pursue long-run profit 
maximisation that may involve foregoing shory-run profit maximisation in favour 
of, for example, market share. This is especially so if the market is growing rapidly, 
or is anticipated to do so (such as pay-television in Australia). This is often the case 
for new high technology products that require increasingly larger scales of 
production. In Australia, telecommunications catriers Telstra and Optus (then 
duopoly catriers) invested heavily in cable facilities for a market which failed to 
live up to early expectations. 
In the perfectly contestable market the entry decision is free of concern about 
retaliation by incumbent firms. Current market prices and costs will be the sole 
guide to the attractiveness of entry if, and only if, hit-and-run entry is the only entry 
strategy contemplated or is completely dominant over other strategies. The post-
entry (game) conditions will obviously be relevant if hit-and-run entry is not 
consistent with long-run objectives. The entrant must contemplate some exposure 
to a rate war until exit can be achieved, at the expense of some windfall profits. 
Milgram and Roberts (1982) outline the rationale for incumbent firms to act 
aggressively, even unto predation, if their conduct establishes a reputation that 
influences the likelihood of future entry where hit-and-run entry is not feasible. In 
the Australian and New Zealand domestic aviation markets, the reputation of the 
incumbent airlines, Qantas, Ansell and Air New Zealand, for matching the prices 
of low cost entrants (such as Compass Mkl and II, Kiwi International and K2000) 
should affect the strategy of potential entrants such as Virgin Airlines. 
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The hit-and-run entry concept shows that as barriers to entry diminish the 
efficacy of potential entry to discipline a market improves, regardless of its 
structnre. The efficacy of other entry strategies will depend on post-entry conditions. 
Conventional entry strategies may be prevented, even if the current market price is 
in excess of the limit price, by the expectation of heavy and protracted post -entry 
losses due to the reaction of the incumbent firms. This synthesis is a useful by-
product of consideration of imperfectly contestable markets. 
In summary, the expectations of incumbent firms' behaviour becomes more 
important as the period of time increases before new entrants (i) can effectively 
serve the same market demands as incumbents or (ii) can operate with a similar cost 
structure as incumbents. The crucial point is that degree of ease for hit-and-run 
entry underpins the degree of contestability of a market and the direct applicability 
of contestability theory to industry policy. 
5. OTHER LEGACIES 
Further developments in contestability theory have arisen. These include the 
concepts of cost contestability and benchmark con testability. 
5.1 Cost Contestability 
Violation of the Bertrand-Nash assumption of the passive incumbent firm is 
common in markets especially when large-scale entry is attempted or in the 
presence of significant sunk costs. In most sitnations firms can change prices 
rapidly in response to entry thus minimising the period in which "cream-skimming" 
by new entrants can occur. However, it is considerably more difficult and time 
consunting for an established firm to change its cost structure. 
The essence of cost contestability, as suggested by Forsyth (1989), is that 
potential entry is most likely to discipline established firms' costs rather than their 
pricing. Potentially, such discipline could lead to technically efficient production, 
a misallocation of resources to incumbents and a transfer between consumers and 
producers. The concept of cost contestability was evaluated in the context of 
Australian domestic aviation (Evenden 1996) and was found to be consistent with 
the incumbent airlines' strategic behaviour in the face of potential competition. 
In general, the strengths of the cost contestability model are that it formally 
adopts a long run perspective and does not assume that incumbent firms hold either 
prices (Bertrand-Nash) or quantities (Coumot) fixed. Furthermore, as a model of 
imperfectly contestable markets, the notion of cost contestability aids understanding 
of corporate responses to the threat of potential market entry. 
5.2 Benchmark Contestability 
Benchmark contestability is an extension of traditional competitive tendering 
arrangements whereby setvices may be put to tender when an incumbent fails to 
meet frequently revised industry benchmarks for service quality, frequency and 
pricing. Within industry benchmarks, the discipline of post-entry conduct is 
introduced through the threat of entry via competitive tender. The utility of the 
concept is to "highlight the fact that the competition is potential in that an operator 
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who cannot adjust performance to conform with any revision of price and quality 
levels will encourage competitive entry via competitive tendering" (Hensher 
1993:8). Its origins lie in the suggestions of auctions for franchise monopolies by 
Demsetz (1968). BPW (1988:413) assert that this method is consistent with the 
Bertrand-Nash assumption given that incumbents committed capital (i.e. sunk 
costs) will be fungible within the industry. 
The imposition of benchmark contestability is designed to replicate the 
discipline of perfect contestability. There are several difficulties with this approach, 
namely (i) the cost structures of the operators may differ from industry norms, 
allowing efficient operators to bid above their minimum costs, (ii) it is assumed that 
a new entrant could operate with the same cost structures and serve the same market 
demands as established operators replaced by the competitive tendering process 
which experience suggests is often not so, (iii) operators face a prisoner's dilemma: 
individually, profits are maximised by minimising costs but as an industry, there is 
little incentive to improve upon industry benchmarks and greater incentive to cost-
pad and slow innovation collectively, and (iv) the re-tendering process is a process 
of actual competition between the incumbent (with associated advantages including 
considerable information asymmetries) and other furns. Such a re-tendering 
process is also likely to draw fewer tenders in receding industries as time passes 
(McGuiness, Gillingwater and Bryman 1994, White 1995). 
6. TESTING FOR CONTEST ABILITY 
Empirical tests for the presence of contestability in a market have the problem that 
their results are not exclusive to contestable markets. The approach of testing the 
nature of the market price-competitive price relationship (namely whether (i) the 
market price (p) is equal to the competitive price (pc }, (ii) p is closer to pc than pm 
(the monopoly price), or (iii) pc = pm) yields ambiguities. The first condition may 
represent perfect contestability or the strong contestable market hypothesis (Baumol 
and Willig 1986:15). The second condition is akin to a weak contestable market 
hypothesis or imperfect contestability. The third condition represents a market that 
would be non-contestable. This may indicate relative market efficiency, but the 
conditions fail to discriminate between the disciplining forces of potential and 
actual competition. So, it is impossible to say whether correspondence with one of 
these three conditions resulted from the effect of potential entrants in a contestable 
market or the non-collusive, highly competitive interaction of oligopolists in a non-
contestable market. 
A second approach to testing for contestability, correlation studies of market 
concentration and profitability, was used before contestability theory emerged. If 
the hit-and-run entry mechanism works, economies of scale will not be a barrier to 
entry and collusion will not be sustainable. Positive correlation between concentration 
and profitability would not be expected in perfectly contestable industries and this 
may be an appropriate test of contestability. Correlation between concentration and 
profitability may not, however, prove the presence of contestability, because it may 
equally arise from competition between incumbents. This testing method cannot 
discriminate between the effects of the two forces: potential and actual competition. 
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Zero economic profits may arise (i) in a perfectly contestable market, (ii) from 
inefficient production under imperfect competition, or (iii) through vigorous 
competition between oligopolists. Similarly, the absence of cross-subsidies by 
incumbents is equally plausible evidence of (i) a perfectly contestable market or (ii) 
of traditional oligopolists engaged in active competition within a market. 
A review of the literature suggests that the ambiguity of the empirical tests of 
contestability is a significant, and commonly nnrecognised, problem in empirical 
studies of contestability. If the effects of the two forces, actual and potential 
competition, are not easily separated then theory and policy should not concentrate 
solely on one (potential competition) and down-play the other (actual competition). 
Shepherd (1984:577) made a similar criticism of contestability theory - the 
external conditions are thought to solely dominate internal market conditions 
according to contestability theory, when internal forces are possibly at least as 
important. This separability problem has important and under-appreciated 
implications for microeconomic policy development. 
It is important to note that some analyses of market conduct and contestability 
in newly deregulated environments have tended to take a static view. The interaction 
between actual competition and potential entrants in an imperfectly contestable 
market is a dynamic process. Actual competition and potential competition act as 
complementary forces. BPW (1988) suggest a range of analytical techniques, 
related to the nature of costs in an industry, which may be utilised to investigate the 
sustainability of an industry's structure. Similarly, they prescribe stand-alone costs 
and incremental costs as the upper and lower bounds of sustainable prices in multi-
product contestable markets. This is not a satisfactory solution as a sustainable 
industry structure and competitive pricing may result from active competition 
between a small number of firms and these are therefore not discrete indicators of 
conduct disciplined by the potential for entry. 
To date, variables indicative of contestable markets remain unspecified and 
empirical tests are consequently ambiguous. This is intuitively consistent with the 
complementarity of actual and potential competition in affecting the conduct of 
firms in highly concentrated markets. 
7. IMPUCATIONS OF CONTESTABIUTY 
7-1 Industry Structure 
Despite the qualifications that arise in the use of contestability theory, it has had a 
considerable impact on economic thought because it considers industry structure 
endogenously. First, contestable markets develop sustainable industry configurations 
with market clearing qualities and possibly no supernormal profits (BPW 1988:314). 
Second, "the prices must yield to each active finn revenues that are no less than the 
opportunity cost of producing its outputs" (BPW 1988:314). Economic losses 
would be consistent with an unsustainable industry structure and market exit. 
Third, "there must be no opportunities for entry that appear profitable to potential 
entrants who regard the prices of incumbent firms as fixed" (BPW 1988:5). That 
is, the incumbents' position must not be dominated by any possible entry strategy. 
The third condition enforces the first two conditions for contestability. 
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The above conditions presented attractive implications about market 
performance regardless of structure. If there are no barriers to entry and exit, the 
threat of potential entry will curtail monopolistic pricing and output restriction. A 
cost-minimising industry structure will prevail. No cross-subsidies, for example, 
will be possible. "The division of the total industry output among its firms must 
minimise the industry's total production cost" (BPW 1988:7). The sustainable 
industry configuration may range from a natural monopoly to atomistic competition. 
A natural monopoly will exist if it is less costly for one firm to produce a given 
quantity than it would be for two or more firms to produce that output. That is, a 
natural monopoly will exist where: "over the entire relevant range of outputs, the 
firms cost function is subadditive" (BPW 1988:17). These results can be contrasted 
with perfect competition that pre-specifies a particular industry structure. Thus an 
important contribution of contestability theory has been to suggest that, given 
particular conditions hold, an efficient industry structure is not necessarily atomistic. 
7.2 Contestability and Regulatory Frameworks 
BPW do not promote deregulation carte blanche, despite the fact that the reduction 
of barriers to entry is perhaps their strongest regulatory prescription. They assert 
that contestability theory is the appropriate framework by which to judge when and 
where government intervention is necessary to achieve efficient outcomes. Perfect 
competition is regarded as "unsuitable as a standard, particularly in circumstances 
common to regulatory and antitrust issues where scale economies and related 
attributes dictate the presence of only a small number of firms, at least some of them 
relatively large" (Baumol and Willig 1986:11). 
Early in the debate, Shepherd (1984:572) suggested that the adoption ofBPW' s 
thesis for policy purposes was premature because the thesis had not been adequately 
tested. Policy implications continue to be drawn from contestability theory, with 
emphasis on the reduction of barriers to entry and exit, firm conduct and an 
endogenously determined optimal structure (eg. Briand and Kelvin 1998). 
One presctiption is that regulation could be used to simulate contestability in 
non-contestable or imperfectly contestable markets (BPW 1988:479). To make a 
market more contestable it may be necessary to deregulate entry andre-regulate to 
ensure that the new conditions of entry do not extend any unnecessary cost or 
strategic advantages to incumbent firms. To improve entry to some markets, Bailey 
(1988:xv) has suggested "there may well be a need to regulate access rules, for 
example, by requiring lease or shared use of sunk cost facilities". Contestability 
theory has been used as justification for the vertical separation of infrastructure 
with natural monopoly characteristics from operations thought "contestible" (e.g. 
above and below rail operations), as well as corporatisation and privatisation of 
utilities in Britain (in the 1980s), New Zealand and Australia (in the 1990s). 
When considering the regulatory and policy implications of contestability 
theory, three issues are notable. First, only in one case- perfect contestability- will 
the presence of potential entrants be a perfect substitute for vigorous competition 
between incumbent firms. In a much broader range of cases-imperfect contestability 
- the forces of actual and potential competition wiJI be complementary and 
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dynamic. The efficacy of the thteat of entry to discipline conduct will be minimal 
when actual competition is vigorous. Therefore, in the vast majority of cases, policy 
should be oriented towards the facilitation and promotion of both contestability 
and actual competition between incumbent firms. 
Second, both short and long-run perspectives are needed in policy development. 
In imperfectly contestable markets, economic profits may be sustained in the short-
run. Long-run economic profits, however, are likely to attract entry from competitors 
with "home market" advantages capable of sustaining establishment costs and 
heavy price competition. To some degree, this may be offset in the long run by 
incumbent frrms minimising the least flexible element of their operations, costs, in 
order to maximise profit and to maximise their ability to compete with low-cost 
entrants. 
Third, policy designed to promote contestability and actual competition should 
be sensitive to specific industry contexts. An understanding of the common 
deviations from competitive and contestable conditions is important, as are 
industry specific imperfections related to the structure of the industry, the nature of 
industry operations, the industry's historical development, regulation, cost structures 
and changes therein. 
Given the extent to which it is believed that contestability theory influences the 
regulatory reform policies of governments, it is imperative that the refinements and 
contextual relevance of contestability theory be appreciated for effective policy 
outcomes. 
8. CONCLUSION 
The legacies arising from the debate over contestability are : (i) the widerrealisation 
by economists that atomistically-determined resource allocation decisions were 
not unique in terms of market efficiencies; (ii) the wider appreciation of the role of 
sunk costs in barring market entry, (iii) the refinements of the theory of the firm in 
terms of the relationship between the degree of barriers to entry and to exit and the 
consequent impact on allocative and technical efficiency, and (iv) the focus of 
attention on the possibility of market entry by firms with the intention of hit-and-
run entry, as opposed to traditional head-to-head competition. 
Given particular conditions, contestability theory suggests that industries do 
not have to be atomistic to be efficient. Therefore for industry regnlation, there is 
no unique virtue in prescribing atomistic competition in all markets if particular 
markets evolve or push toward higher levels of concentration. Hence, in the vast 
majority of cases, regnlation should be directed toward assisting and promoting 
both forces - potential competition from firms not presently in the market and 
actual competition between firms within the market, a point made strongly by the 
Part X Review of the Australian Trade PraCtices Act 1974 (Brazil et. a!. 1993:2). 
A simple "one-shoe-fits-air' approach to industry policy will fail in the light of what 
has been learnt thtough the contestability debate. 
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